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Abstract
A successful organization – or Broadway production – needs the right
team. A potential issue is that incumbent workers in a team might have
a lower marginal return of effort, reducing the incentive for them to in-
vest relative to newcomers. While agents always prefer to be teamed
with others they have worked with before, a principal may wish to use
new team members; this occurs when the loss from lower investment is
sufficiently large. In fact, a principal may select a team of newcomers
even when incumbents produce greater surplus. These insights have
implications for job rotation, centralization-versus-decentralization and
mergers.
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1 Introduction
What does it take for success on Broadway? A Broadway production needs: a
composer; a lyricist; a librettist who writes the dialogue and plot; a choreogra-
pher; a director; and a producer. But who should fulfill these roles? Analyzing
Broadway shows between 1877 and 1990, Uzzi & Spiro (2005) find that finan-
cial and critical success is increasing in the number of the team members who
previously worked together (incumbents), but only up to a point; too many
incumbents decrease the likelihood of a production’s success. Therefore, the
most successful teams comprise some incumbents, but also some newcomers.
Incumbents have some natural advantages. They understand how each
other works; they know others’ strengths, weaknesses and communication id-
iosyncracies. Familiar team members often have a better sense of what the
others will like and dislike, helping agents to avoid proposing and arguing for
ideas that will never be part of the final product. Given the advantage of
incumbents, why choose newcomers? Uzzi & Spiro (2005) emphasize that new
team members bring fresh ideas to the collaborative effort, increasing overall
quality. We focus on a similar rationale for using unfamiliar agents who are
inherently less experienced in working together; experience can decrease the
incentive for agents to invest, ultimately reducing total output (or quality).
In this framework we examine the preferred team composition (incumbents or
newcomers) for the principal and the teammates themselves, and relate our
findings to a variety of applications.
To analyze the choice of team composition we make two key assumptions:
contracts are incomplete, creating an underlying hold-up problem; and final
output depends on both the team experience of the workers and the efforts
they make. Importantly, in equilibrium, each worker’s choice of effort depends
on the potential synergy between team members.
In our model, a principal decides whether a team is made up of two agents
who have worked together before (incumbents) or, alternatively, two agents
with no previous work history together (newcomers).1 Once chosen, each
1Note, we are explicitly referring to experience or familiarity of agents working together;
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team member makes a non-contractible effort. After these efforts are sunk,
all parties negotiate and receive their share of ex post surplus. Incumbent
workers, by their very nature, produce greater output for any given level of
effort. On the other hand newcomer agents, because they have never worked
together before, have a relatively smaller synergy between them. We make
the following important assumption: the additional synergy generated using
incumbent agents relative to newcomers is decreasing in worker effort. In other
words, newcomers can (partially) make up for the smaller synergy they enjoy
by exerting effort. As a result, there is a tradeoff when choosing the team; while
incumbents produce more surplus for any given level of effort, newcomers put
in more effort in equilibrium. This tradeoff gives rise to several results. First,
the (second-best) welfare maximizing team could include either incumbents or
newcomers. Second, a principal may opt for a team of either incumbent or
rookie workers. Furthermore, while a principal will never choose incumbent
agents when newcomers produce more net surplus, a principal could opt for
newcomers too often, failing to maximize welfare. Third, workers themselves
always prefer teams of incumbents, even when welfare is maximized with rookie
team members.
There are many applications of our model. The model is directly relevant
to team composition and job rotation.2 Job rotation, by its very nature, breaks
up old relationships and makes workers start afresh with at least some new
members. This practice is used by many consulting firms; McKinsey & Com-
pany, for example, insists on rotating senior management roles. Our model
suggests there are potential benefits from committing to a job-rotation policy,
as the agents themselves, if left to their own devices, will always choose to
be paired with a familiar (incumbent) partner even if a team of unfamiliar
newcomers produce more. This could also be suggestive as to why some firms
in this sense ‘experience’ means experience on a particular team, and not to their knowledge
or skills in the profession more generally. Similarly, ‘newcomer’ refers to a new member of
that team, not an inexperienced worker, per se.
2Other explanations for job rotation include: eliciting information from agents (Arya
& Mittendorf 2004); avoiding worker boredom (Azizi et al 2010); and limiting scope for
corruption (Choi & Thum 2003).
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use predetermined rotation rules, so as to avoid influence costs (Milgrom &
Roberts 1990). In a similar manner to the Broadway study mentioned above,
Guimera et al (2005) find that the inclusion of newcomers in research teams
increases the probability of a successful scientific collaboration in social psy-
chology, economics, ecology and astronomy.
In another situation, some airlines integrate a permutation constraint in
their cabin crew assignment algorithm that prevents familiar pilots from being
assigned together on the same flight.3 There is likely to be a potential ad-
ditional synergy between familiar workers – for instance, crew members who
know each other well probably communicate more easily – but these airlines
explicitly forgo this synergy. Crew that know each other well may be dissuaded
from undertaking the same level of effort when teamed with each other (check-
ing and cross checking and so on) than when teamed up with a stranger. With
lower effort, the outcome (in terms of safety incidents) could be worse when
familiar agents are paired together, despite the natural synergy. In a similar
way, across a range of sports, even highly successful teams bring in new players
(particularly in the off-season). Rotation of the team in our model does not
rely on the need to replace deadwood or to achieve the right balance of skills;
rather, our model suggests a tradeoff between experience and energy. The
incumbent members know the team plays, structure, and so forth, so rotating
the roster forgoes the synergies that have been built up in the past. But new
team members illicit greater effort from all players, old and new alike, and
effort is crucial for sporting success.
The tradeoff we present also relates to the allocation of decision-making
rights. As noted, if they can, agents tend to choose to work with other in-
cumbent agents too often, whereas a principal can have too much incentive to
choose newcomers. This has implications for how the choice of agents is made.
If encouraging effort is crucial, centralization could be preferred; the princi-
pal can commit to allocating newcomer agents to the task when the agents
themselves cannot do so. For example, a sporting team manager can credibly
commit to select new players to the squad, something the players themselves
3Anonymous industry source.
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cannot do. Similarly, a Broadway production might also use centralized de-
cision making, having a project leader tasked with assembling the team. A
decentralized decision-making structure could be preferred when capturing the
intrinsic synergy between agents is relatively more important than inducing
greater effort. Agents often choose their team-mates in rock bands and study
groups.
The foundation for our analysis is essentially a moral-hazard-in-teams model
(see Alchain & Demsetz 1972, Holmstrom 1982 and Che & Yoo 2001, for exam-
ple). Given the externality between team members, there is always underin-
vestment in effort. In our paper, however, there is an additional consideration
– the choice of team membership. This means that the principal also needs to
take into account how the composition of the team affects agents’ incentives.
Our analysis suggests that the additional synergy between familiar agents can
foster (relative) indolence. If this is the case, choosing unfamiliar newcomers
might be preferred as such an arrangement leads to greater levels of effort (and
surplus).4
This idea has much in common with what social psychologists refer to as
‘social loafing’ or the ‘Ringelmann effect’ (see West 2004), a phenomenon ob-
served in experiments by Ringelmann in the late 19th Century. Ringelmann
found that people put in 75 per cent of the effort pulling a rope when they
thought they were a member of a team of seven (they were blindfolded) com-
pared with their effort as an individual undertaking the same activity (see
Kravitz and Martin 1986).5 This literature also makes a second observation:
the types of individuals in the group make a difference to observed effort. For
instance, Stroebe et al (1996) examine teams working on complex problems.
While team performance exceeded that of individuals, performance was fur-
4Team membership has also been explained by the technological complementarities be-
tween tasks (Brickley et al 2009) or arising from a multi-tasking incentive problem (see
Holmstrom & Milgrom 1991 and Corts 2006, for example).
5Other experiments have found similar effects: people shouted in a team with only 74 per
cent of the effort as they did individually (Ingham et al 1974); when solving mathematical
problems individuals took on average five minutes, groups of 2 individuals took an average
of 3-and-a-half minutes per-person and groups of 4 averaged 12 minutes per-person (Shaw
1932).
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ther improved when high-ability team members thought they were matched
with a low-ability partner.6 The predictions of our model are consistent with
both of these findings: (i) people underinvest when they work as part of a
team; and (ii) effort is lower when (high-ability) agents with a large potential
synergy are paired together, relative to a team with a small synergy (one high-
and one low-ability worker).
There is an existing literature that examines incentive-contract design when
there are externalities between agents – see for example, Segal (1999, 2003),
Bernstein and Winter (2012) and Winter (2004, 2006). These models typically
investigate optimal contracting when the potential externalities are fixed (that
is, they do not vary with effort). In contrast to most of these models, we focus
on the tradeoff between effort and the relationship between agents, so that the
externality varies endogenously in equilibrium. The paper in this literature
most similar to ours is Winter (2012), who examines how the structure of in-
formation inside a firm affects agents’ optimal incentive contracts. Specifically,
he finds that creating an environment with greater information is beneficial
when agents’ efforts are complementary. This is because the dissemination of
information about agents’ effort (or lack thereof) can allow for effective pun-
ishment. The similarities in the two papers are that the work environment
affects investment incentives. In Winter (2012) it is the flows of information;
in our model it is the composition of the team. One key difference is that
Winter explicitly considers incentive contracts based on output, whereas ours
is an incomplete contract model in which each party’s share of surplus arises
from ex post renegotiation.
In a different context, Franco et al (2011) consider how worker types are
matched, when this choice affects the optimal incentive contracts, which de-
pend on type and output. They find that a principal might prefer to forgo
technological complementarities (by not matching two low-cost workers to-
gether) if this allows for a better outcome in terms of effort and the cost
6Social psychologists have invoked various explanations for this phenomenon, including:
individuals feeling that they would be embarrassed if it were revealed they put in more
effort than others; coordination failures; loud talkers drowning out others; and individuals
reducing their effort if they feel it will not be adequately recognized (West 2004).
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of incentive compensation.7 Their result – that positive associated matching
need not hold once effort and incentive contracts are considered – parallels our
result that team-rookies might be preferred. Note also that like in Franco et
al (2011) our focus here is on the incentives created when choosing different
team structures; we do not focus on issues of matching that arise with unob-
servable worker type, such as in Jeon (1996), Newman (2007) and Thiele &
Wambach (1999).
Winter (2009) studies a related moral-hazard-in-teams problem, in which
higher incentives can induce lower efforts – a phenomenon he calls incentive
reversal. This can occur when a larger payoff induces one agent to always
invest, which in turn can generate an opportunity for other agents to free-
ride.8 We can also generate incentive reversal in our model, although we
have a different mechanism at play. With incumbents there is greater surplus
for any given level of effort than with newcomers; this is akin to the larger
payoffs studied in Winter (2009). This additional surplus may lead incumbent
workers to put in less effort, which is similar to incentive reversal. However,
in our paper we go further and show that in equilibrium incumbents, despite
their natural synergy, can produce (and share) less output than newcomers.
That is, not only do incumbent agents exert less effort but they produce less
output despite having a natural synergy between them.
2 The Model
Consider a model with a principal P and two agents, A1 and A2.
9 P owns an
asset that is necessary for production and the two agents can use this asset
to produce the final output or surplus. Each agent can expend some specific
effort ei ∈ [0, ei)
10, for i = 1, 2, with a cost of Ci(ei), where: Ci(0) = 0; Ci(ei)
is twice differentiable; strictly increasing; and strictly convex in ei. Thus, the
7Kaya & Vereshchagina (2010) make a similar point regarding moral hazard in partner-
ships.
8Klor et al (2012) investigates incentive reversal further through a series of experiments.
9This model can be extended in terms of the number of agents.
10Note that ei > 0 and it is possible that ei =∞.
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marginal cost of effort is increasing with the level of investment, as summarized
in Assumption 1.
Assumption 1. The cost function Ci(ei) is non-negative, twice differentiable,
strictly increasing in ei and strictly convex; i.e., Ci(ei) ≥ 0, Ci(0) = 0, C
′
i(ei) >
0 and C ′′i (ei) > 0 for ei ∈ [0, ei) with C
′
i(0) = 0 and limei→ei C
′
i(ei) = ∞ for
i = 1, 2.
Each agent, making his or her investment ei and working with the asset,
can generate individual surplus of vi(ei) for i = 1, 2, respectively, as detailed
below.
Assumption 2. The surplus vi is a non-negative, increasing and concave
production function; that is, vi(ei) ≥ 0, vi(0) = 0, v
′
i(ei) ≥ 0 and v
′′
i (ei) ≤ 0
for i = 1, 2.
The agents can also work together as a team. If the agents work together
they produce a joint surplus v12, where v12(e1, e2, x) > v1(e1) + v(e2). The
additional surplus produced with joint rather than individual production is the
potential synergy S(e1, e2, x) between the two agents. The synergy between
the workers is defined below, which also allows us to differentiate between two
types of agent: an incumbent and a newcomer.11
Definition 1. S(e1, e2, x) = v12(e1, e2, x)−v1(e1)−v(e2) represents the synergy
between two agents, who can be: (a) incumbents if x = 1; or (b) newcomers
if x = 0.
For notational convenience we label S1(e1, e2) ≡ S(e1, e2, 1) for incum-
bent team members, S0(e1, e2) ≡ S(e1, e2, 0) for newcomers and ∆S(e1, e2) ≡
S1(e1, e2) − S0(e1, e2). We also make the following assumption regarding the
nature of the synergy between agents.
11As noted in the introduction, the term incumbent refers to an agent who has worked
with his teammate before; on the other hand, a newcomer refers to an agent with no working
experience with their particular teammate.
8
Assumption 3. The synergy for both incumbents and newcomers is positive
and non-decreasing in effort. In addition, the relative synergy for an incumbent
team compared with newcomers is non-negative and non-increasing with effort.
That is, S1(e1, e2) ≥ S0(e1, e2) > 0 and
∂S0(e1,e2)
∂ei
≥ ∂S1(e1,e2)
∂ei
≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, ∀
e1, e2.
Assumption 3 makes several substantive points. First, each of the two types
of agents – incumbents or newcomers – are complementary in the sense that
the team synergy is positive and non-decreasing in effort. Second, for a given
level of effort a team of incumbents always produces at least as much output as
a team of newcomers. For instance, consider the case of two incumbent agents
who have previously worked with one another and who know each other very
well. Because they understand each other they can effectively coordinate their
activities. On the other hand, two newcomers will not know each other. Given
they have no working history, there is no previous relationship the two can rely
on. This means there will be a few difficulties learning how to work together,
and for a given level of effort the two strangers will produce less output than
two team veterans who are used to working together.
Third, even though the team synergy is always non-decreasing in effort
for both team compositions, the relative advantage of incumbents is (weakly)
decreasing in effort. In other words, two newcomers can partially overcome
their relative disadvantage by working and learning the specific attributes of
their fellow team member. That is, newcomers can learn about the other
agent’s strengths, weaknesses, how they communicate, and so on. As the two
newcomers put in more effort, the relative advantage of the incumbents, while
still there, becomes smaller.
Finally, we would like the profit-maximization problem when agents work
together to be well defined, which requires that v12 is concave. This is sum-
marized below.
Assumption 4. v12(e1, e2, x) is non-negative, increasing and concave in e =
(e1, e2); that is, v12(e1, e2, x) ≥ 0,
∂v12(e1,e2,x)
∂ei
≥ 0, ∂
2v12(e1,e2,x)
∂e2
i
≤ 0 and
∂2v12(e1,e2,x)
∂e2
1
∂2v12(e1,e2,x)
∂e2
2
−
(
∂2v12(e1,e2,x)
∂e1∂e2
)2
≥ 0 for i = 1, 2 and x = 0, 1.
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Note that for Assumption 4 to hold it is sufficient (but not necessary) that
the synergy between either two incumbents or two newcomers is relatively
small compared with the individual surpluses of v1 and v2. It is also sufficient
that the synergy itself is a concave function for the two different types of team.
2.1 Timing and investment solution
The game has the following timing. At date 0, the type of workers on the
team is chosen; specifically, it is decided whether the team should comprise of
incumbent or newcomer agents. At date 1, these agents choose their level of
relationship-specific non-contractible effort. Finally, at date 2, the agents and
principal bargain over their share of surplus. Figure 1 summarizes the timing.
666
t=0
• workers
allocated
• e1 and e2 chosen
t=1 t=2
• bargaining
over surplus
• trade
Figure 1: Timing of the game
Following the literature, we assume that ex post surplus is distributed
according to the Shapley value. Furthermore, no date 1 variable is contractible
at date 0. Let M be the sub-coalition of the grand coalition of all N = 3
agents. Following bargaining, each party j = 1, 2, P receives a share of ex
post surplus Bj so that the sum of the distributed shares is equal to the total
available surplus in the grand coalition, so that
∑
j∈N
Bj(e1, e2, x) = v12(e1, e2, x). (1)
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In a similar way to Hart and Moore (1990), the Shapley value Bj(e1, e2, x)
is defined as follows.
Definition 2. Party j′s share of gross surplus is given by the Shapley value
Bj(e1, e2, x) =
∑
M |i∈M
p(M)[v(M | e1, e2, x)− v(M\{i} | e1, e2, x)], (2)
where p(M) = (|M |−1)!(|N |−|M |)!
(|N |)!
.
Note that because the game is convex the Shapley value is always in the
core.12
3 The incentives to invest
There will be different incentives to invest, depending on whether the team is
composed of newcomers or incumbents. In this section we compare investment
incentives and the welfare implications of the two alternative team structures.
To provide a benchmark for these comparisons, we first analyze the first-best
team structure.
3.1 First-best incentives
Let us compare the first-best incentives and the choice between incumbent and
newcomer agents. The total net surplus is v12(e1, e2, x) − C(e1) − C(e2) and
the first-best investments e∗1 and e
∗
2 solve:
∂vi(ei)
∂ei
+
∂S(e1, e2, x)
∂ei
=
∂Ci(ei)
∂ei
, ∀ i = 1, 2, x = 0, 1. (3)
The solution for each agent’s investment choice exists and is unique given
Assumptions 1,2 and 4. Note that, given ∆S(e1, e2) ≥ 0 ∀ e1, e2, both total
and net surplus are always weakly higher with incumbent rather than with
rookie agents. This means net surplus is maximized using incumbents.
12See Osbourne and Rubinstein (1990, exercise 295.5), for example.
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Result 1. The first-best outcome always entails using incumbents rather than
newcomers.
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above.
As ∆S ≥ 0, total surplus is weakly higher with incumbent agents – for
any level of effort, a switch from newcomers will increase gross surplus with-
out altering costs. If an enforceable contract can be written on effort, using
incumbents is always optimal.
3.2 Second-best incentives
As a complete contract cannot always be written, consider the investment
decision of the two workers taking into account ex post bargaining. Since the
principal is indispensable and at least one of the agents is indispensable13, the
ex ante payoff given by the Shapley value for each agent is14:
1
2
vi(ei) +
1
3
S(e1, e2, x)− Ci(ei), ∀ i = 1, 2. (4)
Anticipating renegotiation, incumbent agents will set their effort to maxi-
mize their ex ante payoff. The equilibrium levels of effort eI1 and e
I
2 solve the
following first-order conditions:
1
2
v′i(ei) +
1
3
∂S1(e1, e2)
∂ei
=
∂Ci(ei)
∂ei
, ∀ i = 1, 2. (5)
On the other hand, if the agents are newcomers, their equilibrium levels of
investment eN1 and e
N
2 are given by:
1
2
v′i(ei) +
1
3
∂S0(e1, e2)
∂ei
=
∂Ci(ei)
∂ei
, ∀ i = 1, 2. (6)
Similar to the first-best case, the solution for each agent’s investment choice
13An assumption that the two team members are indispensable would alter the shares
each party receives but leads to the same qualitative tradeoffs.
14See the Appendix for a detailed derivation of the shares of gross surplus for the agents
and the principal.
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exists and is unique due to Assumptions 1, 2 and 4. Moreover, given Assump-
tions 2 and 3 it follows that:
eIi ≤ e
N
i , ∀ i = 1, 2, (7)
as summarized below.
Result 2. An agent exerts a lower level of effort when paired with another
incumbent rather than a newcomer; that is, eIi ≤ e
N
i , ∀ i = 1, 2.
This leads to the following Corollary that we will make use of in our sub-
sequent analysis.
Corollary 1. ∆Ci(ei) = Ci(e
N
i )− Ci(e
I
i ) ∀ i = 1, 2 is always non-negative.
Equilibrium effort – and effort cost – is always greater for an agent paired
with another rookie team member rather than a worker who she has had
previous experience with. This result follows because the marginal return
from effort is lower with incumbent agents; that is, the relative size of the
synergy for veteran workers over their greenhorn counterparts – is decreasing
in effort (Assumption 3).
In addition, it is worth noting that newcomers can invest more than the
first-best level of effort. Due to the underlying hold-up problem there is always
underinvestment, irrespective of the type of team chosen. However, the first-
best team is always composed of incumbents. It can be the case then that the
equilibrium level of effort chosen by newcomers eNi is more than the optimal
level of effort based on using a veteran team. We illustrate this point in
Example 1.
3.3 The principal’s choice of team composition
We now consider the principal’s choice of team-mates. It follows that, when the
surplus generated by greater effort is relatively more important than protecting
the relative synergy of incumbents, the ex post surplus may be higher with
newcomers rather than with incumbent agents. At date 0, the principal will
choose to select two incumbent (newcomer) agents if and only if:
13
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vN1 +
1
2
vN2 +
1
3
SN0 ≤ (≥)
1
2
vI1 +
1
2
vI2 +
1
3
SI1 , (8)
where for notational convenience, we denote SI1 as the team synergy generated
when incumbents invest eI1 and e
I
2 and S
N
0 as the synergy generated when
newcomers invest eN1 and e
N
2 . We also simplify notation by indicating the
effort level as a superscript in each value function.15
Examining this equation, if SN0 ≥ S
I
1 the principal will always use newcom-
ers. The interesting case, however, is when there is a tradeoff for the principal
between using incumbents or newcomers. This happens when the equilibrium
synergy of newcomers is less than the equilibrium synergy of incumbents. From
hereon, we use the following assumption.
Assumption 5. The equilibrium synergy of incumbents is greater than the
equilibrium synergy of newcomers; that is, SI1 > S
N
0 .
Note that for this assumption to hold it is sufficient (but not necessary)
that the increase in the newcomer synergy with respect to effort is not too
high, relative to the difference in synergy.16
Now consider the payoff to each agent when matched with either an in-
cumbent or a newcomer as their fellow co-worker. Using a revealed-preference
argument, if an agent is paired with an incumbent partner, the agent i’s payoff
will be at least as large with a choice of effort eIi rather than with a choice
of eNi . The same argument can be made for an agent on a newcomer team –
eNi yields at least as much for an agent in a rookie team as does exerting e
I
i .
Following this logic, the rational choice of individual i ensures that:
1
2
vNi +
1
3
S1(e
N
1 , e
I
2)− Ci(e
N
i ) ≤
1
2
vIi +
1
3
SI1 − Ci(e
I
i ), ∀ i = 1, 2; (9)
15Note that for ease of exposition we allow the principal to choose either team structure
if the equation holds with equality.
16This condition is satisfied for production and cost functions typically used. Indeed, we
had difficulty finding any explicit function for which this assumption does not hold. For
instance, see Example 1.
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and
1
2
vNi +
1
3
SN0 − Ci(e
N
i ) ≥
1
2
vIi +
1
3
S0(e
I
1, e
N
2 )− Ci(e
I
i ), ∀ i = 1, 2. (10)
Summing for both agents, these two conditions are:
1
2
vN1 +
1
2
vN2 +
2
3
S1(e
N
1 , e
I
2)−∆C1(e1)−∆C2(e2) ≤
1
2
vI1 +
1
2
vI2 +
2
3
SI1 (11)
and
1
2
vN1 +
1
2
vN2 +
2
3
SN0 −∆C1(e1)−∆C2(e2) ≥
1
2
vI1 +
1
2
vI2 +
2
3
S0(e
I
1, e
N
2 ). (12)
Comparing (8) and (11), a sufficient condition for choosing incumbent
agents is:
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤
2
3
S1(e
N
1 , e
I
2)−
1
3
SI1 −
1
3
SN0 . (13)
Given Assumption 3, it follows that S1(e
N
1 , e
I
2) ≥ S
I
1 . This means the
following condition ensures that (13) is satisfied
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤
1
3
SI1 −
1
3
SN0 , (14)
where SI1 > S
N
0 from Assumption 5. For convenience this condition can be
rewritten as
X ≤
1
3
, (15)
where we introduce the following notation X = ∆C1(e1)+∆C2(e2)
SI
1
−SN
0
.
Comparing (8) and (12), it turns out that a sufficient condition for choosing
newcomers is:
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≥
1
3
SI1 +
1
3
SN0 −
2
3
S0(e
I
1, e
N
2 ). (16)
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Given Assumption 3, it follows that S0(e
I
1, e
N
2 ) ≥ S
I
0 , where we denote S
I
0 as
the synergy generated when newcomer agents invest eI1 and e
I
2. This means
the following condition ensures that (16) is satisfied
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≥
1
3
SI1 +
1
3
SN0 −
2
3
SI0 , (17)
which is
X ≥
1
3
+
2
3
Y, (18)
where we introduce the following notation Y =
SN
0
−SI
0
SI
1
−SN
0
. Note, from Assump-
tions 3 and 5, Y ≥ 0.
In summary, we have outlined the sufficient conditions for the principal to
use incumbent agents and, secondly, when she will choose newcomers. These
conditions are detailed in the following result.
Result 3. A sufficient condition for the principal to choose incumbent agents
is that ∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤
1
3
SI1 −
1
3
SN0 , while the sufficient condition for
principal to choose newcomers is that ∆C1(e1)+∆C2(e2) ≥
1
3
SI1 +
1
3
SN0 −
2
3
SI0 .
Figure 2 shows the potential level of output with the two alternative team
structures. Focusing on e1 (and suppressing the role of e2 for exposition),
v1 + v2 + S1 is the potential surplus with veteran agents, while v1 + v2 + S0
is the potential surplus with newcomers. From Assumption 3, the additional
synergy that incumbent agents generate (relative to newcomers) is (weakly)
monotonically decreasing in effort e1. This means that the marginal return
of e1 is less for a veteran worker; consequently, their equilibrium investment
level is eI1 ≤ e
N
1 . Hence, there is a tradeoff for the principal; the additional
synergy with incumbent workers must be compared with the additional surplus
generated by the higher effort put forth by new team members. Critically, this
comparison needs to be made at the equilibrium levels of effort for the two
alternatives. The principal will choose to allocate the type of agents that will
maximize her return, which is her share of gross surplus at renegotiation, and
this could be either incumbents of newcomers.
It is worth comparing this result with Proposition 3 in Che and Yoo (2001).
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Figure 2: Surplus with incumbent and newcomer team members
They find that a principal will opt for individual rather than team production
if there is no synergy between the workers. In contrast, our result suggests that
a principal might opt for newcomer agents even when incumbents produce a
larger synergy, provided there is a sufficient change in effort.
3.4 The agents’ choice of team structure
We now turn to the preferences of the agents themselves as to the makeup of
their team. Agent i will choose to be paired with a fellow incumbent if:
1
2
vNi +
1
3
SN0 −∆Ci(ei) ≤
1
2
vIi +
1
3
SI1 (19)
for i = 1, 2. Given (9), and
SN0 < S
I
1 < S1(e
N
1 , e
I
2),
this inequality will always hold, ensuring that the agents themselves will always
want to be paired with a veteran partner.
Result 4. Agents always want to be in an incumbent team.
Agents always prefer fellow incumbent workers in their team, as being
paired with another veteran allows an agent to enjoy a share of the larger
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intrinsic synergy that is forthcoming in incumbent teams. It also allows the
agents to reduce their effort in equilibrium, of which they receive the full
savings.
3.5 Second-best optimal choice of team structure
We showed earlier that a principal might choose to use newcomer agents, for-
going the additional synergy generated between veteran team members. Now
consider the choice of team composition made by a social planner, whose goal
is to maximize (second-best) total welfare, given each agent’s choice of equi-
librium effort. In particular, this allows us to compare the welfare maximizing
team composition to the principal’s choice.
Welfare will be higher with incumbent (newcomer) team members if and
only if:
vN1 + v
N
2 + S
N
0 −C1(e
N
1 )−C2(e
N
2 ) ≤ (≥)v
I
1 + v
I
2 + S
I
1 −C1(e
I
1)−C2(e
I
2). (20)
Comparing (11) and (20), it turns out that a sufficient condition for welfare
to increase with incumbents is:
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤
4
3
S1(e
N
1 , e
I
2)−
1
3
SI1 − S
N
0 . (21)
Given Assumption 3, it follows that S1(e
N
1 , e
I
2) ≥ S
I
1 . Using the same argument
as above, if
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤ S
I
1 − S
N
0 (22)
then (21) is satisfied. Inequality (22) can be rewritten as
X ≤ 1. (23)
Comparing (12) and (20), it turns out that a sufficient condition for welfare
to increase with newcomers is:
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≥ S
I
1 +
1
3
SN0 −
4
3
SI0 , (24)
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or that
X ≥ 1 +
4
3
Y. (25)
From the arguments above, we construct sufficient conditions for when
newcomer or incumbent agents maximize (second-best) welfare, summarized
in the result below.
Result 5. A sufficient condition for total welfare to be higher with incumbents
rather than newcomers is that ∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) ≤ S
I
1 − S
N
0 . A sufficient
condition for total welfare to be higher with newcomers is that ∆C1(e1) +
∆C2(e2) ≥ S
I
1 +
1
3
SN0 −
4
3
SI0 .
We are now in a position to compare the principal’s choice of team compo-
sition (Result 3) with the welfare maximizing one (Result 5). To help analyze
this issue, consider Figure 3. In this figure, the vertical axis is Y =
SN
0
−SI
0
SI
1
−SN
0
,
which is the change in the newcomer synergy given eN1 rather than e
I
1, relative
to the difference in equilibrium synergy with incumbents rather than newcom-
ers. The horizontal axis is X = ∆C1(e1)+∆C2(e2)
SI
1
−SN
0
, which is the increase in effort
costs associated with newcomers rather than incumbents relative to the dif-
ference in equilibrium synergy with incumbents rather than newcomers. Note
that we are only interested in area X ≥ 0, Y ≥ 0 because of Corollary 1 and
Assumption 5.
In the Figure, in region A the principal will always choose incumbents;
the condition X ≤ 1
3
indicates the sufficient condition for incumbent workers
to be chosen. Similarly, in regions C, E and F the principal will always
choose newcomers; the sufficient condition is that X ≥ 1
3
+ 2
3
Y . Where neither
sufficient condition holds, in areas B and D, depending on the specific cost
and production functions either type of team composition could be chosen by
P .
From a social planner’s perspective, the vertical line X = 1 indicates the
sufficient condition required for incumbents to produce greater net surplus in
equilibrium; veterans are required to maximize surplus in regions A, B and
C. The sufficient condition for newcomers to maximize welfare is satisfied in
region F (where X ≥ 1 + 4
3
Y ). Using similar intuition as before, in areas D
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Figure 3: Total welfare and firm choice of newcomers or incumbents
and E either type of team composition could maximize second-best welfare,
depending on the specific functions used.
Note that in region C the principal will choose a team of newcomers, but
the welfare-maximizing choice is for veterans to be used. From a social welfare
point of view, the principal opts for the wrong type of workers. This point is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When X ∈ [1
3
, 1] and Y ∈ [0, 3X−1
2
] hold, the principal chooses
newcomers, even though (second-best) welfare is maximized by using incumbent
workers.
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above.
This suggests that, for some parameter values the principal has too much
propensity to choose newcomers. This arises because the principal considers
her share of ex post surplus but does not consider the increase in ex ante costs,
∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2), as these costs are borne by the agents. If the increase in
costs is relatively high as compared with the decrease in the relative size of
the team synergy between the newcomer and incumbent levels of effort, the
principal tends to choose newcomers too often.
The following example highlights some of the results of the previous dis-
cussion.
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Example 1
Assume that the coalition containing only one agent i and the principal gen-
erates a surplus of vi = 2ei. The coalition containing two incumbents and
the principal generates additional constant surplus of S1, while the coalition
containing two newcomers and the principal generates additional surplus of
S0 = min[3β(1 + e1 + e2), S1], where β > 0. The costs for both agents are
Ci(ei) = e
2
i for i = 1, 2. Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied. In the first-best case,
the optimal efforts are e∗1 = e
∗
2 = 1. In the case of newcomers, their individual
efforts solve the following system:
{
1 + β = 2e1,
1 + β = 2e2.
(26)
This gives eN1 = e
N
2 =
1+β
2
. From equation 6, incumbents choose their efforts
to be eI1 = e
I
2 =
1
2
. As we discussed earlier, the newcomers’ effort can be larger
than the first-best level; specifically, eNi > e
∗
i if β > 1.
Given these equilibrium efforts, we can calculate SN0 = 3β(2 + β) and
SI0 = 6β. To ensure Assumption 5 is satisfied, that is S
I
1 > S
N
0 , assume that
S1 = αS
N
0 , where α > 1.
Next, we calculate ∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) =
(1+β)2
2
− 1
2
. This yields X =
∆C1(e1)+∆C2(e2)
SE
1
−SU
0
= (1+β)
2−1
6β(2+β)(α−1)
= 1
6(α−1)
and Y =
SN
0
−SI
0
SI
1
−SN
0
= 3β
2
3β(2+β)(α−1)
=
β
(2+β)(α−1)
. Dividing X by Y and simplifying yields Y = 6β
2+β
X . Note that,
as β > 0, all the points with X > 0 and 0 < Y < 6X are feasible for this
specification.17
Given the specific functions used, the actual condition for the principal to
choose incumbent agents (condition 8) is Y ≥ 6X − 2, illustrated in Figure 3
by the dashed line that cuts area B. Similarly, the actual condition that char-
acterizes the area in which incumbent workers maximize welfare (condition 20)
is Y ≥ 3X − 3, the dashed line cutting area E. Note that these two dashed
17As illustrated in Figure 3, all points to the right of the dashed line that crosses A are
feasible. Note that this example uses a relatively simple specification with linear payoffs.
Points to the left of this dashed line could be feasible using a specification with strictly
concave payoffs.
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lines never cross. As we discuss in the next section, this is an illustration of the
fact that a principal’s choice of incumbents must also maximize second-best
surplus. 
3.6 Principal’s team choice and total welfare
Next, consider the case when the principal opts to use incumbent workers.
As it turns out, if the principal chooses incumbents it is always the case that
an incumbent team maximizes social welfare. The intuition for this can be
demonstrated with the aid of Figure 2. The principal is concerned about their
share of gross surplus (from their Shapley value) from the two alternatives,
respectively. If the principal anticipates a higher payoff with veterans it must
be the case that incumbents also maximize net surplus because not only in-
cumbent gross surplus is higher than newcomer gross surplus, but effort costs
are also lower with incumbents (Corollary 1). This result is captured in the
Figure 3 and discussed in Example 1; the two dashed lines crossing areas B and
E do not intersect. This discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Whenever a principal chooses incumbents in equilibrium, a
social planner would also make the same choice regarding team composition;
that is, incumbents are (second-best) welfare maximizing.
Proof. See Appendix.
In our framework, if we observe a principal opting for incumbents, this
choice also maximizes (second-best) welfare. But as noted in subsection 3.4,
agents always prefer to be on a team with someone that they have worked with
before. As a consequence, if P chooses incumbents, there is no difference be-
tween a centralized (principal) or decentralized (agents-based) decision about
team composition; both decision-making structures yield the same outcome.
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4 Incentive reversal
As noted in the Introduction, Winter (2009) shows the possibility of incentive
reversal in which an increase in the payoffs (incentives) can result in most
agents reducing their effort. In this section we show that we can produce
equivalent results. In our framework, incentive reversal would be when an
improvement in the technology that produces more surplus and returns for each
worker, for every level of effort, leads to a decrease in equilibrium efforts of all
agents. To make a more direct comparison with Winter (2009), in this section
we relax Assumption 3, allowing the relative synergy to be both increasing
and decreasing in effort.
Let us first establish the conditions when incentive reversal cannot occur
in equilibrium, a parallel result to Proposition 1 in Winter (2009). This is
outlined in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Equilibrium efforts are immune to incentive reversal if syn-
ergies are complementary for all team types and the relative synergy of an
incumbent team compared with newcomers is non-negative and non-decreasing
with effort; that is, S1(e1, e2) ≥ S0(e1, e2) > 0 and
∂S1(e1,e2)
∂ei
≥ ∂S0(e1,e2)
∂ei
≥ 0 for
i = 1, 2, ∀ e1, e2.
Proof. See Appendix.
In Winter (2009), incentive reversal relies on increasing returns with respect
to agents’ efforts and it is not possible with decreasing returns. Here, we only
consider the case of decreasing returns to scale. In our model, as noted in
Proposition 3, incentive reversal will not be observed if the relative synergy
for incumbents versus newcomers is always non-negative and non-decreasing in
effort. In this case a principal will always choose an incumbent team because
not only do incumbents enjoy a larger synergy but they also put in more effort
than newcomers.
Incentive reversal is possible in our framework, however, if this is not the
case. This is illustrated in the Example below. Moreover, we show that
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incentive reversal can reduce total welfare and that the principal can choose
the structure that produces lower surplus.
Example 2
Let us augment Example 1 by assuming α = 1.1 and β ∈ [0, 10]. In the case
of incumbent agents, the equilibrium efforts are eI1 = e
I
2 =
1
2
, while in the case
of newcomers, the equilibrium efforts are eN1 = e
N
2 =
1+β
2
. One can see that
efforts are smaller for incumbents; that is, there is an incentive reversal. Let
us calculate total welfare in the case of incumbent agents
W I = v12(e
I
1, e
I
2)− C1(e
I
1)− C2(e
I
2) = 1.5 + 6αβ + 3αβ
2; (27)
and the principal’s payoff
P I =
1
2
v1(e
I
1) +
1
2
v2(e
I
2) +
1
3
S(eI1, e
I
2) = 1 + 2αβ + αβ
2. (28)
The total welfare in the case of newcomers is
WN = v12(e
N
1 , e
N
2 )− C1(e
N
1 )− C2(e
N
2 ) = 1.5 + 7β + 2.5β
2; (29)
and the principal’s payoff is
PN =
1
2
v1(e
N
1 ) +
1
2
v2(e
N
2 ) +
1
3
S(eN1 , e
N
2 ) = 1 + 3β + β
2. (30)
Figure 4 shows the difference in total welfare, W I−WN , and the difference
in principal’s payoff, P I − PN , both as a function of β. When β ≤ β1 the
total welfare is maximized with the newcomers; despite the higher synergy,
total welfare is lower with incumbents. On the other hand, incumbent agents
produce more surplus in equilibrium if β > β1. The principal’s interests are
different, however. When β ≤ β2, the principal prefers newcomers. It is only
when β > β2, that she would opt for incumbents. Importantly, for β1 ≤
β ≤ β2 the principal chooses newcomers even though incumbents are welfare
maximizing choice, as outlined in Proposition 1. 
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Figure 4: Total welfare and principal’s payoff
In Winter (2009), in contrast to our paper, effort is a discrete choice, result-
ing in a discontinuity in an agent’s best-response function. If another party’s
payoff increases sufficiently so that they have a dominant strategy to invest,
an agent’s best response might be to switch to low effort. In our model the
agents’ choice is continuous; incentive reversal arises due to the fact that the
rate of the increase in team synergy is smaller for agents with a larger abso-
lute synergy between them, as shown in the Example above. It is important
to note that in our model incentive reversal may result in all team members
decreasing their effort. This is not possible in Winter (2009) where only a
subset of agents decrease their effort.
Given that it may decrease total welfare, incentive reversal is another illus-
tration of how the environment – here the production technology – can affect
worker effort and total welfare in a counter-intuitive way. In such a situation a
principal, if they could, would opt to not implement the more efficient produc-
tion technology, realizing its negative impact on overall output after changes
in agents’ effort are accounted for.
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5 Discussion and concluding comments
Getting the right team matters a great deal; simply choosing team mates with
the most natural synergy between them is not always the best option. Rather,
teams comprising of agents with a lower intrinsic synergy sometimes provide
better performance. This could be why workgroups often include rookie mem-
bers. It is said that a champion team will beat a team of champions. Our
analysis suggests that even if a team of champions would perform better for
a given level of effort, a team of journeymen could outperform them precisely
because the less lauded unit has a greater incentive to put in effort (both in
training and in the game).
There are several key elements driving our result. First, there is contrac-
tual incompleteness in the model, in that the agents cannot write contingent
contracts on either surplus or effort ex ante. If parties have the ability to con-
tract on effort, the first-best outcome can be achieved, and incumbent workers
will always be used together. However it is often difficult to contract on effort,
be it in producing a musical, in sport or business. Second, we assume that
the relative synergy when using incumbent workers is decreasing in the effort
or investment made; this means that the marginal return from effort – while
always positive – is lower for incumbents than it is for newcomer workers. The
combination of these effects can together mean that (second-best) surplus is
higher with newcomers rather than incumbents. What the model suggests
is that the true nature of a synergy needs to be considered in equilibrium –
agents that end up producing more output might be the team members who
do not necessary intrinsically work best together.18
It is also worth noting that our focus has been on the choice between
incumbents and newcomers, both of whom enjoy a positive synergy. However,
the same point can be made for other types of agents; it is the relative difference
in the marginal return of effort that helps determine team structure. For
example, a principal may have to choose a team with a positive synergy or
18To make things clear, this model examines this tradeoff in a relatively simple setting.
In particular, we consider a static model and abstract from the choice of team composition
over time. We leave this issue for further research.
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agents with no team synergy at all (independent workers). Similarly, the choice
could be between independent workers or those who are substitutes at the
margin (see Bel (2012)). For both of these two new alternatives, provided that
the marginal return of effort is lower for agents with a positive synergy than
for ones with no synergy (in the first case), or for the independents rather than
substitutes (in the second), the relative differences between the two options
are qualitatively the same as the incumbent/newcomer tradeoff examined in
our model. That is, for instance, it could be that a firm or principal chooses
to hire substitute workers even though they intrinsically produce less output
for a given level of effort, provided this choice induces greater effort.19
There are many applications of the model. As noted, if incumbency reduces
the incentive to invest, it could be that a policy of job rotation increases total
surplus (in consulting projects, musical productions or in research projects).
When deciding the composition of a team, an organization might wish to
choose workers that do not otherwise have the highest possible synergy between
them. Note that our result differs from the usual moral-hazard-in-teams result
(see Holmstrom 1982 for example); conditional on the type of workers chosen,
we get under-investment in our model due to holdup regardless as to the type
of worker, but the equilibrium level of effort is determined by the choice of
the type of agent in the team. Moreover, it is possible that we can observe
overinvestment in equilibrium by a team of newcomers.
Our framework also has implications for the allocation of decision-making
rights. A principal can have a tendency to choose newcomers too often; the
agents themselves always prefer to have incumbent team-mates, even if new-
comers produce greater net surplus. This suggests that when inducing greater
effort (from newcomers) is more important, the choice of team should be made
centrally by the principal; on the other hand, when taking advantage of a nat-
ural synergy is more important, it might be advantageous for the principal to
commit not to get involved, having the decision decentralized to the agents
19One example we have in mind is a firm hiring a difficult or obnoxious worker – their
presence might naturally hinder output relative to a more congenial colleague, but this could
be made up for if their presence on the team creates an additional incentive to work harder.
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themselves.
Our model also applies to the joint use or co-location of assets. Using
some assets together rather than separately can generate an additional natural
synergy, but this could also change parties’ incentives to engage in ex ante
investment. The standard predictions in the property-rights models (Hart and
Moore 1990 and Hart 1995 for example) suggest that complementary assets
should be owned together, so as to provide the best possible incentives for ex
ante investment. Our model generates results in the same vein as Bel (2012),
who finds that assets with a positive synergy need not be owned together
when they are substitutes at the margin. Unlike Bel (2012), however, we do
not assume that the investments by incumbents are substitutes at the margin.
In our model both incumbents and newcomers enjoy a positive synergy that is
increasing with effort. Rather, it is the relative difference in the synergy that
drives our result.
Another question is who should decide which assets are to be used together?
The decision could be centralized to a principal, perhaps under the auspices of
one firm. The alternative is to decentralize this choice to unit managers. As
noted above, centralization (common ownership) is preferred when choosing
less synergistic assets is important.
Finally, our model suggests that sometimes the most obvious takeover or
merger targets are not the best. There have been some spectacular M&A
failures - for example AT&T/NCR, Quaker Oats/Snapple, Daimler/Chrysler
and AOL/Time Warner. In all these cases the participants expected signifi-
cant synergies that did not eventuate. The failure of M&As is conventionally
attributed to cultural differences between the two firms or a failure to conduct
proper due diligence. While these factors are undoubtedly important, they do
not explain the observation that ‘the acquiring firms in ‘related’ mergers do
not benefit or are actually worse off compared to unrelated as well as horizontal
mergers’ (Chatterjee 2007). Our model suggests that – just like high-synergy
incumbents being paired together – it is exactly the mergers that seem to have
the largest synergy between the assets can create a (relative) disincentive to
invest, leading to lower surplus overall.
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Appendix
Derivation of the surplus shares for the principal and
agent
Let us derive the ex ante payoffs given by the Shapley value for each team
member and the Principal with the help of equation (2). The payoffs of coali-
tions are as follows: v(P,A1, A2) = v12, v(P,A1) = v1 and v(P,A2) = v2, while
all other coalitions give zero payoffs. Consequently,
B1 =
1
6
v1 +
1
3
(v12 − v2) =
1
2
v1 +
1
3
S, (31)
B2 =
1
6
v2 +
1
3
(v12 − v1) =
1
2
v2 +
1
3
S, (32)
and
BP =
1
6
v1 +
1
6
v2 +
1
3
v12 =
1
2
v1 +
1
2
v2 +
1
3
S. (33)
This concludes the derivation. 
Proof of Proposition 2
First, from equation (8) if vI1 + v
I
2 − v
C
1 − v
C
2 <
2
3
(SI1 − S
N
0 ), the principal will
choose two incumbent agents. Second, from equation (20), when vI1 + v
I
2 −
vC1 − v
C
2 < S
I
1 − S
N
0 +∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) it is efficient to choose incumbents.
The difference between the right-hand side of these two equations is 1
3
(SI1 −
SN0 ) + ∆C1(e1) + ∆C2(e2) > 0. Consequently, if equation (8) is satisfied,
equation (20) is satisfied as well. This proves the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3
With incumbents, the equilibrium levels of investment solve the following first-
order conditions:
1
2
v′i(ei) +
1
3
∂S1(e1, e2)
∂ei
=
∂Ci(ei)
∂ei
, ∀ i = 1, 2. (5)
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With newcomers, the equilibrium levels of investment solve the following
first-order conditions:
1
2
v′i(ei) +
1
3
∂S0(e1, e2)
∂ei
=
∂Ci(ei)
∂ei
, ∀ i = 1, 2. (6)
As ∂S1(e1,e2)
∂ei
≥ ∂S0(e1,e2)
∂ei
, relative investment incentives are higher for in-
cumbents. Moreover, surplus must be higher because not only do incumbents
enjoy a larger synergy but they also put in more effort than newcomers. See
Mai et al (2013) for an equivalent proof. 
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